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Abstract
Land rental market development and off-farm employment have important implications for agricultural 
production. This study examined the effects of land rental market participation, the resulting land tenure 
contracts, and off-farm employment on the technical efficiency in rice production in rural China, using 
the one-step stochastic frontier approach. Data from a survey held at household and plot level in three 
villages in north-east Jiangxi Province were used to estimate the stochastic frontier model. We found that 
the mean technical efficiency of rice production in north-east Jiangxi Province ranged from 0.36 to 0.97, 
with an average of 0.82. The determinants of technical efficiency show that households that rented land 
achieved higher technical efficiency than households that did not rent land. Rice production on rented 
plots was technically as efficient as on contracted plots. Additionally, participation in migration did not 
have an effect on technical efficiency.
Additional keywords: migration, stochastic frontier approach, technical efficiency
Introduction
Economic reforms initiated in the late 1970s have drastically affected the development 
of the Chinese agricultural sector. In particular, the switch from collective farming 
to the household responsibility system (HRS) has resulted in an important change 
in the land tenure system, where farmland is still owned by the village collective but 
production and management of farmland are entrusted to individual households 
through long-term contracts. The implementation of this new land tenure system 
brought about a rapid growth of agricultural productivity in the early reform years 
(1979–1984) because of the institutional innovation, which links farm households’ 
income closely with their own performance (McMillan et al., 1989; Fan, 1991; 
Lin, 1992). The rising agricultural productivity decreased the demand for labour 
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in agriculture, providing a strong incentive for rural labourers to shift to off-farm 
employment. Since the early 1980s an off-farm economy has emerged, consisting of 
jobs in Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs), in urban centres and more recently 
private enterprises, and has accelerated its growth since 1995 (De Brauw et al., 2002).
 Farmland in China is legally owned by the village collective. Under the HRS, 
land use rights have been equally assigned by the village collective to individual 
farm households for a period of up to 15 years, depending on family size, labour 
force, or a combination of both. Land transfers were initially not allowed, because 
policy makers believed that land transfers would lead to a concentration of land in 
the hands of a few households, leaving most households landless. Instead, frequent 
administrative reallocations of land by the village collective have been used to correct 
for demographic changes. All of these have resulted in insecure land use rights, which 
are often considered to reduce farm households’ incentive to carry out long-term land 
investment. To solve these problems, the Chinese government has permitted land 
rentals since the mid-1980s and allowed land use rights to be extended for another 30 
years in 1993. Since then a rural land rental market has emerged.
 Theoretically, a land rental market can enhance allocative efficiency and 
agricultural productivity by equalizing the marginal product of land among households 
with different land–labour endowments and by facilitating transfers of land from less 
productive households to more productive ones (Faruqee & Carey, 1997; Carter & 
Olinto, 1998; Carter & Yao, 1999; 2002; Deininger & Feder, 2001; Deininger, 2003; 
Deininger & Zegarra, 2003; Deininger et al., 2003; Deininger & Jin, 2005; Yao, 2007). 
However, in present-day China land rental arrangements are generally informal, short 
term, and between households living in the same village. Plots rented from other 
households are therefore subject to tenure insecurity, which may discourage long-term 
land investment and reduce agricultural productivity. 
 The effect of off-farm employment on agricultural production is ambiguous. Off-
farm employment reduces the labour available for agricultural production, especially if 
hiring agricultural labour incurs transaction costs and if hired labour is not as efficient 
as family labour. Off-farm employment also enables households to increase their 
incomes, to overcome credit and insurance constraints and to increase their use of 
industrial inputs (Rozelle et al., 1999a; Taylor et al., 2003). In addition, the reduction 
in food consumption resulting from household members working off-farm (e.g., those 
who migrate) may have an impact on agricultural production decisions if household 
production and consumption decisions are non-separable (Burger, 1994; Wouterse, 
2006). 
 Most of the literature concerning land and labour market development and 
agricultural production in rural China has focused either on the land (Lohmar et al., 
2001; Carter & Yao, 2002;) or on the labour market (Wu & Meng, 1997a, b; Rozelle et 
al., 1999a; Taylor et al., 2003). Previous studies on the effect of land tenure contracts 
on agricultural production have focused on South Asia (Shaban, 1987; Otsuka  & 
Hayami, 1988; Binswanger et al., 1995) and Africa (Gavian & Fafchamps, 1996; Gavian 
& Ehui, 1999; Ahmed et al., 2000; Place & Otsuka, 2000; Benin et al., 2005; Pender 
& Fafchamps, 2006). The focus of these studies has been on comparing the relative 
efficiency of owner-operated, rented, or sharecropped plots. Many studies found an 
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efficiency loss of sharecropped land relative to owner-operated land.
 Empirical evidence shows that agricultural factor markets in rural China, 
particularly land and labour, face many institutional obstacles and remain 
underdeveloped (Carter & Yao, 2002; Bowlus & Sicular, 2003). Faced with land and 
labour market imperfections, household production and consumption decisions 
may be non-separable and household may make simultaneous decisions on land and 
labour market participation and agricultural production. To our knowledge there has 
been no research that has analysed the effect of land and labour market participation 
on agricultural production in rural China. The objective of this study was therefore 
to estimate the technical efficiency in rice production and examine the effect of 
land rental market participation, the resulting land tenure contracts, and off-farm 
employment on technical efficiency in rural China. 
 This study used the stochastic frontier approach. It differs in several ways from 
previous technical efficiency analyses in China (Tan, 2005; Chen et al., 2006). First, 
the input and output data were collected at plot level. This was expected to yield more 
accurate technical efficiency scores, because plot characteristics (e.g., soil quality) 
are different across plots. Second, only rice plots were included in the sample, as 
production technologies and technical efficiency may differ across different crop 
species. Third, a one-step stochastic frontier approach was applied to overcome the 
misspecification of the efficiency levels (Kumbhakar et al., 1991; Coelli et al., 1998).
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next chapter presents 
the empirical stochastic frontier model and the data used in this study. Then the 
estimation results are presented. The paper concludes with summarizing the main 
findings and finally drawing some policy implications.
The stochastic frontier model
Theoretical model
A stochastic frontier production model (Aigner et al., 1977; Battese & Corra, 1977; 
Meeusen & Van De Broeck, 1977) is applied to estimate the technical efficiency scores 
for different plots, as measurement errors and weather-related random disturbances 
are substantial in analysing plot level data (Coelli, 1995). This means that we estimate a 
production function with an error term consisting of two components, one to account 
for pure random effects and another to account for technical inefficiency (TIE). This 
production function can be expressed as follows:
  Yi = xiβ + (vi – ui)      (1)
where Yi is the output of plot i (i = 1, ......., n), xi is a vector of inputs of the ith plot, β is 
a row vector of an unknown parameter to be estimated, vi is the random error of plot i, 
which is assumed to be independently and identically distributed (iid) as N(0, σ2),
and independent of the ui, a non-negative random error, which is assumed to account 
for technical inefficiency (TIE) and often assumed to be iid and have a half normal 
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N+(0, σ2) distribution. It varies between 0 and 1.
 Technical efficiency is defined as TEi = exp(–ui). The technical efficiency 
determinants are expressed as:
  TEi = ziδ       (2)
where zi is a vector of factors that may determine the technical efficiency and does not 
contain any variables in xi; δ is a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated.
 Parameters β, δ, σv, σu, and TE are estimated by the maximum likelihood method. 
Data
The data used in this paper were collected in three villages in north-east Jiangxi 
Province described in Feng & Heerink (2008). Farm household level data were 
collected for the year 2000. Plot level data, however, were not collected then. Out of 
the 329 households interviewed in 2000 and 2001, 52 households were randomly 
selected. The analysis here is limited to households that rented land. This is because it 
is impossible to ask households about their rice production on leased plots. Plot level 
agricultural production data were collected in January 2003 for the entire year 2002. In 
total 215 rice plots were surveyed: 56 in Banqiao, 74 in Shangzhu and 85 in Gangyan 
(Feng & Heerink, 2008). This is because rice is the dominant crop in the research area. 
Collected information includes tenure status of the plots, inputs and output of each 
plot, plot characteristics, and soil quality.
Model specification and estimation methods
Specification of the frontier production function
First, a frontier production function was specified. In frontier production analysis 
generally two types of production functions are used: the Cobb-Douglas and the 
translog function. The relatively large number of inputs that we distinguished in this 
study greatly complicates the application of a translog function. For the analysis of the 
data we therefore chose the Cobb-Douglas production function. 
 Agricultural production depends in general on land area, labour, seed, inorganic 
fertilizers, herbicides and pesticides, animal and mechanical traction, and soil quality. 
The descriptive statistics of the variables used in our stochastic frontier production 
function estimation, subdivided by land market regimes and tenure status of the plot, 
are presented in Table 1.
 Households in the surveyed area grow either one or two rice crops a year. The yields 
vary among varieties. For our study the yields have been aggregated and measured in 
monetary units. The average rice output was 884.12 yuan per plot, or 297.73 yuan per 
mu and the average plot area per household used for rice production was about 2.92 
mu (Table 1). Labour used for rice production was measured in man-days per plot. 
Households work on average around 97.04 days on each plot, or 40 days on each mu of 
land. Seed, inorganic fertilizers, herbicides and pesticides, and animal and mechanical 
traction used for rice production were measured in monetary units. All inputs in 
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the Cobb-Douglas production function were expected to have a positive effect on rice 
production, except for herbicides and pesticides. Their effects on land productivity depend 
on whether they are applied for the prevention or control of weeds and pests.
 In addition to the traditional inputs, rice production is influenced by the quality of 
the soil. In this study, topsoil depth was used as soil quality indicator. Topsoil depth 
was estimated by soil scientists, and measured in centimetres. It was expected that rice 
production is positively correlated with topsoil depth. Two dummy variables for the 
Banqiao and Shangzhu villages were included to capture the variation in other factors 
that systematically differ between the villages. It was assumed that the production 
frontier may shift by village.
Specification of the technical efficiency function
Technical efficiency is likely to be affected by factors that are associated with farm 
management practices (Forsund et al., 1980), including indicators of plot tenure 
security, plot characteristics, farm characteristics, household characteristics, household 
participation in the land rental market and off-farm employment. Descriptive statistics 
of the variables used in technical efficiency determinant estimation, subdivided by land 
market regimes and tenure status of the plot are listed in Table 2.
 Plot tenure security is represented by the tenure status of the plot. Two plot tenure 
Land rental, off-farm employment and technical efficiency of farm households in Jiangxi Province, China 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the stochastic frontier production function estimation, in 
relation to land rental market regime and tenure status of the plots.
Item Unit/ Type of household
dummy
 values Renting  Self-sufficient All plots
  Contracted Rented Contracted
  (n = 60) (n = 43) (n = 112) (n = 215)
  - - - - - - - - - - - - - -   [Mean (standard deviation)] - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Dependent variable
Gross value of rice output yuan 1 948.03 (719.56) 1341.28 (1930.26) 674.36 (739.02) 884.12 (1106.09)
Explanatory variables
Area planted mu 2 2.97 (2.20) 3.88 (5.03) 2.53 (2.41) 2.92 (3.10)
Labour used days 97.58 (69.97) 115.35 (108.90) 89.73 (58.53) 97.04 (74.49)
Seed  yuan 25.26 (25.57) 28.77 (43.10) 26.16 (23.13) 26.43 (28.70)
Inorganic fertilizers  yuan 163.95 (157.70) 213.89 (271.79) 112.14 (143.74) 146.95 (183.54)
Herbicides & pesticides yuan 31.80 (27.08) 44.25 (71.37) 26.06 (24.62) 31.30 (39.55)
Oxen & tractors used yuan 73.16 (57.87) 92.35 (113.36) 69.47 (97.67) 75.08 (92.04)
Topsoil depth cm 16.73 (4.54) 17.80 (3.86) 16.36 (3.74) 16.75 (4.02)
Banqiao dummy 0 or 1 0.22 (0.42) 0.12 (0.32) 0.34 (0.48) 0.26 (0.44)
Shangzhu dummy 0 or 1 0.15 (0.36) 0.07 (0.26) 0.55 (0.50) 0.34 (0.48)
1  Based on price level of 2002. Since the autumn of 2003 prices have risen considerably.
2  1 mu = 1/15 ha.
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statuses were distinguished: contracted and rented. Contracted plots are plots that are 
distributed directly by the village collective. Rented plots are plots rented from other 
households. Of all the plots in the analysis, 172 plots were contracted, and 43 plots 
rented. A dummy variable, which equals 1 when the plot was rented and 0 when the 
plot was contracted, was used to indicate the tenure status of the plot. Normally, the 
land rental arrangements are verbal and of short duration. Rented plots are therefore 
less secure than contracted plots and expected to be negatively correlated with technical 
efficiency. Plot characteristics are represented by the distance between plot and home. 
This distance is measured in minutes travelling time. A longer travelling time raises 
the cost of carrying inputs from home. On distant plots, farm households tend to apply 
inputs in larger quantities and at lower frequencies. Distance is thus expected to be 
negatively correlated with technical efficiency.
 Farm characteristics were represented by the number of cattle in a household at the 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the technical efficiency determinant estimation, in  rela-
tion to land market regime and tenure status of the plots.
Item Unit/ Type of household
 dummy
 values Renting    Self-sufficient All plots
  Contracted Rented Contracted
  (n = 60) (n = 43) (n = 112) (n = 215)
  - - - - - - - - - - - - - -   [Mean (standard deviation)]1   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Dependent variable
Technical efficiency  0.87 (0.10) 0.89 (0.10) 0.77 (0.15) 0.82 (0.14)
Explanatory variables
Rented plot (A) 0 or 1 0.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.20 (0.40)
Household renting land (B) 2   0.72 (0.26) 0.77 (0.24) 0.14 (0.20) 0.43 (0.38)
A ∑ B interaction  0.00 (0.00) 0.77 (0.24) 0.00 (0.00) 0.15 (0.33) 
Participate in migration 0 or 1 0.53 (0.50) 0.40 (0.49) 0.54 (0.50) 0.51 (0.50)
Distance from home minutes 11.76 (8.22) 17.92 (13.63) 11.23 (10.29) 12.71 (10.81)
Household size persons 5.60 (1.44) 5.40 (1.43) 4.79 (1.91) 5.13 (1.73)
No. of dependants persons 1.98 (1.32) 2.26 (1.42) 1.39 (1.02) 1.73 (1.24)
No. of durable assets  7.08 (1.41) 7.30 (1.32) 6.46 (1.67) 6.80 (1.57)
Total number of cattle  1.17 (1.76) 2.16 (3.22) 0.67 (0.47) 1.11 (1.82)
Age household head years 51.15 (13.11) 46.84 (13.29) 45.46 (9.81) 47.33 (11.75)
Education household head years 3.78 (2.49) 4.37 (2.61) 5.24 (2.86) 4.66 (2.78)
Female-male adult ratio  1.12 (0.67) 1.14 (0.57) 1.09 (0.69) 1.11 (0.66)
No. of plots  4.33 (1.74) 4.30 (1.32) 4.98 (1.96) 4.67 (1.81)
Irrigated land per adult mu 3 2.39 (1.65) 3.25 (2.10) 2.06 (1.38) 2.39 (1.68)
1  Means in the same row, printed in bold are statistically different (P < 0.005).
2  Household renting decisions are possibilities predicted with a probit model (see Appendix 2).
3  1 mu =  1/15 ha.
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end of the previous year, age and education of the head of the household, the household 
land endowment, and the number of plots that a household had. In the research area, 
cattle are very important draft animals for small-scale households. The number of 
cattle in a household is expected to have a positive impact on technical efficiency, as 
the availability of cattle is associated with the timeliness of land preparation in rice 
production. Age of the household head was used as a proxy for the family’s farming 
experience. The effect of age on technical efficiency is ambiguous, depending on 
whether older farmers are more experienced or more likely to stick to farming 
traditions and less likely to adopt new technologies. Education of the household head 
was used as a proxy for the management skills of a family. Technical efficiency is 
expected to increase with education as education increases the household’s ability to 
utilize existing technologies and make farm management decisions (Battese & Coelli, 
1995). The household land endowment was represented by the area of irrigated land 
contracted per adult. The household land endowment is expected to have a positive 
impact on technical efficiency, because a larger land endowment implies the economy 
of scale. The square of this variable was added to the equation to capture the possible 
non-linearities in its impact. The number of plots in a household is an indicator of land 
fragmentation, which can have either negative or positive effects on technical efficiency 
(Tan, 2005). On the one hand, a larger number of plots needs more labour (Nguyen 
et al., 1996) and may be more difficult to manage. On the other hand, it enables 
households to optimize their labour allocation over different crop species and seasons, 
especially if there is no market for agricultural labour (Fenoaltea, 1976).
 Household characteristics were represented by the number of durable assets in 
a household, household size, number of dependants in a household, and the ratio 
female−male adults. Households with more durable assets are expected to face fewer 
obstacles in agricultural production, as they have more resources available for paying 
fixed costs and for obtaining the information needed to adopt new technologies. So the 
number of durable assets in a household is expected to improve technical efficiency. 
Household size, number of dependants in a household and the ratio female–male 
adults are expected to affect technical efficiency through their effects on the household 
time endowment. Larger households and those with fewer dependants are expected to 
be technically more efficient since they have more labourers available to implement 
farm management practices in time. The ratio female–male adults is used to test for 
differences between females and males in physical strength or other differences in 
agricultural production. Males are more likely to deal with farming operations that 
require much physical strength. It is therefore expected that a higher value of this ratio 
will lead to a low technical efficiency.
 As mentioned previously, households renting land are expected to achieve a higher 
technical efficiency because a developed land rental market enables the transfer of 
land from less efficient, to more efficient households. Following Pender & Fafchamps 
(2006), the interaction between households renting land and the rented plot dummy 
was included in the model to test for differences in technical efficiency on contracted 
and rented plots for households that rent land. This is because it is not possible to 
determine these differences from the average effect of either the tenure status of the 
plot or households renting land. Off-farm employment affects technical efficiency 
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in three ways. The first one is through the lost-labour effect. Off-farm employment 
can be expected to reduce technical efficiency, especially if hiring agricultural labour 
incurs transaction costs and hired labour is not as efficient as family labour. The 
second one is through the income effect. Off-farm employment is expected to increase 
household incomes, and thereby facilitate the use of material inputs and improve 
technical efficiency (Rozelle et al., 1999a; Taylor et al., 2003). The third one is through 
the reduced-consumption effect. Household members working off-farm (e.g., off-
farm employment by migrated members) means less food consumption and therefore 
reduces agricultural production if household production and consumption decisions are 
non-separable (Burger, 1994; Wouterse, 2006). So the effect of off-farm employment 
on technical efficiency is ambiguous. 
Estimation method
The stochastic frontier model can be estimated using one-step or two-step approaches. 
In the two-step procedure, the frontier production function and the firm’s efficiency 
levels (TE) are estimated first (Equation 1), ignoring a set of variables (z) that affect 
technical efficiency. In the second step, efficiency levels (TE) are regressed against 
the variables (z) to see how efficiency levels vary with these variables (Equation 2). 
However, the two-stage procedure has long been recognized to yield biased results 
because the model estimated at the first step is misspecified (Coelli et al., 1998; Wang 
& Schmidt, 2002). A one-step procedure is suggested to solve the bias problem, in 
which the relationship between technical efficiency and the variables is imposed 
directly in estimating the frontier production function and the firm’s efficiency levels 
(Kumbhakar et al., 1991; Wang & Schmidt, 2002). The maximum likelihood estimates 
were computed using the statistical package STATA 9.
 All explanatory variables in Equation 2 should be exogenous. However, households’ 
participation in land renting as well as off-farm employment may be endogenous as 
they depend on household characteristics, farm characteristics, household land and 
labour endowments, institutional factors, and market rent, wage, and other prices 
[see Feng & Heerink (2008) for details]. As mentioned earlier, data on household 
participation in off-farm employment were collected for the year 2000, whereas data 
on household participation in land renting and plot level agricultural production 
were collected for the year 2002. Household participation in off-farm employment 
is therefore treated as exogenous, and represented by households’ participation in 
migration in the year 2000. Decisions on land renting were made in the year 2002 and 
may therefore be considered endogenous. Inclusion of endogenous variables in the 
estimation may result in biased estimates. Instrumental variables are used to address 
this endogeneity problem. First a probit model was used to estimate land renting at 
the farm household level, and to predict the probability of households’ participation in 
land renting. The predicted probability was then used as an instrument for the actual 
participation in the land rental market in maximum likelihood estimates. 
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Estimation results
Determinants of renting land
The dependent variable for renting land is a binary variable, which equals 1 if the 
household rented land in year 2002, and 0 otherwise. The explanatory variables 
and their expected effects were specified and discussed in detail in Feng & Heerink 
(2008). The statistics of the explanatory variables, grouped by households’ land market 
participation decisions, are summarized in Appendix 1. 
 Of all the households in the three villages, 19 households rented irrigated land 
in 2002. The results of the probit model are presented in Appendix 2. A U-shaped 
relationship was found between land availability and land renting decisions. This 
finding confirms the result for the initial 329 households analysed by Feng (2006), 
i.e., that households with both low and high land availability are more likely to rent 
additional land. A possible explanation is that households with relatively large land 
availability tend to specialize in agricultural production and therefore want to enlarge 
their farm size. The turning point was 2.35 mu. 
 The land transfer rights indicator positively affected land-renting decisions. This 
confirms the hypothesis that households that enjoy more land transfer rights tend to 
rent additional land. Households’ migration experience did not affect land renting. 
The results for the two village dummy variables indicate that there were significant 
differences between the villages in market wage, land rent and other factors affecting 
renting land. Households in Banqiao and Shangzhu villages were less likely to rent 
additional land than households in Gangyan village.
The stochastic frontier production function and technical efficiency scores
The results of the stochastic frontier production function are presented in the upper 
part of Table 3. As expected, output responded positively to land, labour and inorganic 
fertilizers. The elasticities of output with respect to land, labour and inorganic fertilizers 
were 0.93, 0.06 and 0.06, respectively, indicating the importance of land as a scarce 
resource for rice production in China. Surprisingly, output responses to seed and 
oxen and tractor were negative and statistically significant. The sum of the elasticities, 
excluding soil quality and the two village dummies, was 0.94. A test for constant returns 
to scale is rejected for rice production. The quality of the plot, represented by topsoil 
depth, is an important determinant of rice production. The elasticity with respect to 
topsoil depth was 0.18, suggesting the importance of improving soil quality for rice 
production. The results for the two village dummy variables indicate that plots in Banqiao 
and Shangzhu village achieve a lower rice output than the plots in Gangyan village. 
 Technical efficiency scores obtained from the stochastic frontier production 
function are summarized in Table 2. The average technical efficiency score for our 
sample was 0.82, which is consistent with an earlier study conducted in the same 
villages (Tan, 2005). This indicates that on average 82% of the potential output can be 
obtained by using the current mixture of production inputs. It also reveals the challenge 
and potential for improving rice production in north-east Jiangxi Province. The technical 
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Table 3. Frontier production functions and technical efficiency estimates.
Independent variable  Coefficient 1 z-score
Stochastic frontier function
ln area planted (mu) 2   0.92*** 17.57
ln labour used (days)  0.08** 2.25
ln seed used (yuan)  −0.05*** −2.98
ln inorganic fertilizer used (yuan)  0.06* 1.70
ln herbicides and pesticides used (yuan)  0.001 0.05
ln oxen and tractor used (yuan)  −0.07*** −3.10
ln topsoil depth (cm)  0.18*** 2.79
Banqiao dummy  −0.11*** −2.71
Shangzhu dummy  −0.17** −2.40
Intercept  5.27*** 19.01
Factors determining technical efficiency
Type of tenure
Rented plot 3 (A)  −0.48 −0.39
Land rental market participation and off-farm employment
Household renting land 3 (B)  1.78** 2.10
Interaction A ∑ B  0.07 0.04
Participate in migration (1 = yes)  −0.38 −0.89
Other variables
ln distance from home (minutes)  0.21 1.11
ln household size (persons)  2.15** 2.09
ln number of dependants (persons)  −1.49** −2.30
ln number of durable assets  0.10 0.21
ln total number of cattle  −0.88 −1.59
ln age of household head (years)  −0.70 −0.65
ln education of household head (years)  −0.20 −0.71
ln ratio female / male adults  −0.99** −1.65
ln number of plots  −2.11*** −3.49
ln irrigated land per adult (mu)  1.23** 2.22
ln (irrigated land per adult) squared  0.78 1.29
Intercept  5.65 1.19
σv  0.14*** 7.50
Number of observations 215
log likelihood 35.41
Wald χ2 (8) 3809.98
P > χ2 0.00
1 Level of statistical significance. *: P = 0.10; **: P = 0.05; ***: P = 0.01. 
2 1 mu = 1/15 ha.
3 Renting decision is predicted probability estimated by a probit model (see Appendix 2). A test for multicoli-
 nearity of variables included showed that the mean variance inflation factor (VIF) was 4.72. For area planted, 
 type of tenure and the interaction term, VIF was 12.14, 11.01 and 12.18, respectively. However, this multicoli-
 nearity is inevitable since these variables must be included in the analysis. An attempt was made to normalize
plot output and inputs by plot area in order to solve the multicolinearity detected, but the results were not 
 importantly different.
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efficiency estimates ranged from 0.36 to 0.97. Of all the plots in our sample, around 
35% had technical efficiency scores below 0.82. This suggests that substantial gains in 
rice production can still be obtained by improving farm management practices under 
the existing technologies. 
Determinants of technical efficiency
The results for the determinants of technical efficiency are presented in the lower part 
of Table 3. The technical efficiency did not differ significantly between rented plots and 
contracted plots, indicating that rented plots are technically as efficient as contracted 
plots. A possible explanation is that land investments are less on rented plots due to 
insecure tenure, but that more variable inputs are used because households renting 
land tend to maximize short-term agricultural profits on these plots. Households 
renting land achieved a higher technical efficiency. This finding confirms the result 
of earlier research by Lohmar et al. (2001) and Feng (2006), i.e., that land rental 
markets could facilitate the transfer of land from less productive households to more 
productive households. For households that rent land, no difference was found in 
technical efficiency between rented plots and contracted plots. This is shown by 
the insignificance of the sum of the coefficients for rented plots and the interaction 
between household renting land and rented plot (0.41; P = 0.63). This finding indicates 
that there is no efficiency loss on rented plots relative to contracted plots (Shaban, 
1987; Pender & Fafchamps, 2006). Participation in migration did not have an effect on 
technical efficiency.
 Household size positively affected technical efficiency, whereas the number of 
dependants had a negative effect, indicating that larger households and households 
with fewer dependants were technically more efficient. An explanation for this may 
be that these households consume more food and therefore strive for a higher output. 
In addition, these households have more labour endowment available for timely farm 
management practices. As expected, the ratio female–male adults had a negative effect 
on technical efficiency. Surprisingly, land availability positively affected technical 
efficiency, indicating either an increasing returns to scale or imperfections in factor 
markets. The number of plots in a household negatively affected technical efficiency, 
which indicates that land fragmentation reduces technical efficiency. 
Conclusions 
Land rental market development and off-farm employment have important implications 
for agricultural production. Applying household and plot level data, this study 
investigated the technical efficiency in rice production and examined the effect of 
land rental market participation, the resulting land tenure contracts, and off-farm 
employment on technical efficiency in three villages in north-east Jiangxi Province. A 
one-step stochastic frontier approach was applied to overcome the misspecification of 
the efficiency levels (Kumbhakar et al., 1991; Coelli et al., 1998). 
 We found that the mean technical efficiency of rice production in north-east Jiangxi 
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Province was 0.82, suggesting that there is an 18% scope for increasing rice production 
under the existing technological conditions. The technical efficiency estimates ranged 
from 0.36 to 0.97. Results from the determinants of technical efficiency show that 
rented plots are technically as efficient as contracted plots. This finding confirms that 
there is no efficiency loss on rented plots relative to contracted plots. Households 
renting land achieve a higher technical efficiency, indicating that the development 
of land rental markets allows land to be transferred to those that are more capable 
of earning a high return from agricultural production. The results therefore suggest 
that policies to stimulate the development of land rental markets could contribute 
significantly to agricultural production in rural China. 
 The findings also show that participation in migration does not have an effect 
on technical efficiency. A possible explanation of this finding is that agricultural 
production in the research area is characterized by a small farm size and a large labour 
surplus and that the remittances sent by migrants are mainly used for non-agricultural 
purposes, such as building houses and marriage. Although off-farm employment does 
not directly affect agricultural production, policies aimed at improving access to off-
farm employment opportunities may at least improve labour productivity in agricultural 
production and household incomes in rural China. 
 Our analysis was affected by a number of limitations. First, to facilitate the use of 
the one-step stochastic frontier approach some strong assumptions had to be made 
about the standard errors, such as homoskedasticity, and independence of different 
plots managed by the same household. The statistical issues of testing the validity of 
these strong assumptions need to be addressed in future research. Second, the analysis 
focused on the plot and not on the household. By focusing on plots, this study ignored 
implicitly the heterogeneity between different households. However, this is inevitable 
in this kind of analysis (Ahmed et al., 2002). 
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Appendix 1
Descriptive statistics of the variables used in land rental market participation
Item Unit/ Type of household
 dummy
 values Self-sufficient Renting land All households
  in land
  (n = 33) (n = 19) (n = 52)
Household size persons 4.70 (1.86) 1 5.47 (1.50) 4.98 (1.77)
No. of dependants persons 1.33 (0.99) 1.79 (1.32) 1.50 (1.13)
No. of durable assets  6.52 (1.82) 7.11 (1.41) 6.73 (1.69)
Total number of cattle  0.67 (0.48) 1.32 (2.19) 0.90 (1.39)
Age of household head years 45.39 (9.81) 2  (12.62) 47.75 (11.24)
Education of household head years 5.27 (2.83) 3.84 (2.50) 4.75 (2.78)
Female-male adult ratio   1.13 (0.74) 1.23 (0.79) 1.17 (0.75)
Irrigated land per adult mu 3 1.88 (1.26) 2.24 (1.76) 2.01 (1.46)
Possession land contract 0 or 1  0.15 (0.36) 0.21 (0.42) 0.17 (0.38)
Land transfer rights  0.56 (0.13) 0.64 (0.13) 0.59 (0.13)
Participate in migration 0 or 1 0.52 (0.51) 0.53 (0.51) 0.52 (0.50)
Banqiao dummy 0 or 1 0.33 (0.48) 0.21 (0.42) 0.29 (0.46)
Shangzhu dummy 0 or 1 0.55 (0.51) 0.16 (0.38) 0.40 (0.50)
1  Means with standard deviation in parentheses.
2  Means in the same row, printed in bold are statistically different (P < 0.10). 
3  1 mu =  1/15 ha.
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Appendix 2
Determinants of land renting probit model
Independent variable Estimated coefficient 1
 (z-score)
ln household size (persons) 1.46 (0.81)
ln number of dependants (persons) –0.39 (–0.35)
ln number of durable assets 0.45 (0.66)
ln total number of cattle 1.34 (1.53)
ln age of household head (years) –15.61 (–0.35)
ln (age of household head)2  2.35 (0.41)
ln education of household head (years) 0.20 (0.35)
ln ratio of female / male adults –0.24 (–0.24)
ln irrigated land per adult (mu) –1.41 (–2.81)***
ln (irrigated land per adult)2  0.83 (2.11)**
Possession land contract (1 = yes) 0.64 (1.11)
Land transfer rights 3.39 (1.82)*
Participate in migration (1 = yes) –0.67 (–1.10)
Banqiao dummy –1.92 (–2.22)**
Shangzhu dummy –2.79 (–3.52)***
Intercept 20.88 (0.25)
Number of observations 52
log likelihood –16.85
Pseudo R2 0.51
Correctly specified (%) 88.46
1  Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. Statistical significance: * = P < 0.10;  ** = P < 0.05; 
 *** = P < 0.01. Test for multicolinearity among variables shows that mean variance inflation factor 
 (VIF) is 2.07, and VIF for each individual variable is lower than 10. 
